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CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE RISKS: 
INFORMATION GAPS, SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY, AND REGULATORY REFORM 
WENDY WAGNER AND LYNN BLAIS 
The regulatory reform movement has focused the nation’s 
attention on the importance of prioritizing our regulatory agenda to 
assure that the worst risks are addressed first and that the costs of 
regulations do not far exceed the benefits they promise to deliver.1  
Virtually all of the regulatory reform activities within the Executive 
Branch over the past decade involve tools that purport to improve the 
reliability of the publicly-funded research used for regulation2 and the 
agencies’ analytical methods for conducting risk assessments, cost-
benefit analyses, and peer review.3  Yet these calls for regulatory 
reform are premised, often implicitly, on the “fact” that there are 
cogent scientific assessments of environmental risks. 
In some important health areas, however, there is effectively no 
useable base of scientific information from which to develop these 
quantitative prioritizations and cost-benefit comparisons.  Thus, while 
reformists debate the multiple ways to characterize uncertainty in risk 
 
 1. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 37-39 (2000); John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-
Dec. 1986, at X; Tammy O. Tengs & John Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 172-73 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).  See also Richard W. Parker, The 
Empirical Roots of the “Regulatory Reform” Movement: A Critical Appraisal, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 359 (2006), for an analysis of these studies and an evaluation of the ongoing debate about 
their methodologies and usefulness. 
 2. See, e.g., Data Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A, 153-55 (2001) (passed 
as a rider to an appropriations bill, § 515 of the Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001); Data Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 
495 (1998) (passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999).. 
 3. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (OMB), Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 
Fed. Reg. 2600 (proposed Jan. 17, 2006); OMB, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer 
Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005); OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
(2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
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assessment or which discount rates to use in a cost-benefit analysis,4 
other unstudied and unregulated health risks—which might be just as 
or even more significant—drop out of the regulatory reformists’ radar 
screen altogether.  Data-poor issues cannot be priorities, by 
definition, in a system that demands numbers as a prerequisite for 
engaging in the problems. 
In this article, we argue that current approaches to setting 
regulatory and research priorities must find a way to include health 
risks for which there is little information, except for “snapshots” that 
suggest potentially serious consequences.  Indeed, we argue that the 
most important set of health risks may be precisely those where there 
is limited existing regulation and effectively no data or research.  
Until the system engages in these unknown risks, the health threats 
will continue without research or regulatory oversight. 
Children’s health, the subject of the 2006 Duke Environmental 
Law and Policy Forum symposium, provides a perfect case study, 
both for underscoring the potential significance of certain 
unregulated and unmonitored health risks and for developing a 
method by which these problems can be brought back into regulatory 
prioritization schemes.  The scientific unknowns that surround 
understanding of environmental exposure risks to children’s health 
are legend.5  There is a limited theoretical base for designing studies 
to test for toxicity to children,6 few actual measurements of child 
exposures to environmental toxins,7 and only preliminary research on 
how children’s physiology or development might lead to different 
expressions of toxicity when compared to adults for any given 
environmental insult.8  Indeed, for certain toxic risks, such as pesticide 
mixtures and indoor air toxic exposures, the uncertainties and 
unknowns—both in theory and in simple measurements—are 
 
 4. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1998); Richard L. 
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). 
 5. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NETWORK, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE FIELD, available at http://www.cehn.org/WhatisPEH.html (discussing how there are more 
than 70,000 chemicals in commerce and “[l]ittle is know about the health effects of the majority 
of these chemicals on children”). 
 6. See, e.g., Philip J. Landrigan & Anjali Garg, Chronic Effects of Toxic Environmental 
Exposures on Children’s Health, 40 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 449, 453-54 (2002); see also Elaine 
M. Faustman et al., Mechanisms Underlying Children’s Susceptibility to Environmental 
Toxicants 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 13 (Supp. 1, Mar. 2000) 
 7. See, e.g., Landrigan & Anjali, supra note 6, at 453 (advocating greater monitoring of 
environmental health risks to children). 
 8. See, e.g., Faustman et al., supra note 6, at 13. 
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overwhelming.9  Thus even while scientists make impressive progress 
in understanding some important risks to children’s health, other risks 
that could be just as dangerous may be largely unexamined and 
therefore unaddressed. 
Not surprisingly, in large part because of this mismatch between 
the current trajectory of regulatory reform and the looming 
unknowns that plague some environmental health research, children’s 
health has been strikingly absent from the nation’s regulatory agenda, 
at least in terms of meaningful regulatory requirements.10  To begin to 
address this oversight we suggest a new method for identifying and 
including these under-studied health risks as priorities in the national 
regulatory agenda.  Unlike the quantitative-dependent methods 
advanced by regulatory reform proponents, our approach does not 
begin with scientific evidence of harm because that evidence is 
systematically biased against children’s unique or heightened risks.  
Rather, we adopt a triage-like methodology that identifies regulatory 
gaps—essentially ways that the current laws systematically under-
protect children’s health—and match those gaps or “legal blind spots” 
to available scientific snapshots of ambient concentrations or, where 
possible, exposure data and adverse health effects.  This triangulation 
of science and law provides an important piece of the puzzle in 
identifying the worst risks by spotlighting potentially serious 
problems affecting children’s health that are nevertheless ignored by 
regulators and, because of the resulting limited federal grants, many 
researchers. 
This legal blind spot approach to identifying regulatory priorities 
has the added benefit of addressing not only regulatory gaps, but also 
the underlying information gap.  Precisely because the problems we 
identify are not regulated with science-based goals, there is often little 
corresponding effort by the government to attempt to assess the risks 
created by these exposures, creating a kind of regulatory inertia 
“Catch 22.”  Our triage approach is intended to identify areas where 
greater regulation could both reduce risks to children’s health and 
generate scientific information to further assess those risks.  This 
science could then form the basis of effective and efficient regulatory 
responses to these risks, complementing the regulatory reform 
agenda rather than falling out of its reach. 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Despite an Executive Order calling attention to the problem, Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 
C.F.R. 157 (1979), there appears to have been little change in many of the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s policies and risk assessments.  See  Faustman et al., supra note 6. 
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We introduce our “legal blind spots” approach to identifying 
potentially significant environmental risks to children’s health in four 
parts.  In the first section, we survey the regulatory reform debate to 
highlight the dependence of this movement on existing scientific 
assessments of exposure risks.  In the second section we explain why 
this dependence is likely to leave substantial risks to children’s health 
unaddressed, and outline our method for identifying those children’s 
health risks that are likely to be substantial yet still unregulated.  In 
the third section we apply our methodology to identify several 
categories of risks that we believe to be the most serious based on this 
triangulation of gaps in environmental protection and scientific 
snapshots of insults to children’s health.  In the final section we offer 
suggestions for next steps that directly confront and attempt to 
overcome the vicious circle of ignorance and inattention to 
potentially worrisome “unknown” risks.  Because we know little to 
nothing about the extent of these risks, it may be difficult to make the 
problems politically salient.  We offer suggestions to address this 
problem. 
I.  REGULATORY PRIORITIES AND EXISTING SCIENCE 
Scientific assessments of environmental threats to children’s 
health are generated either from the individual research agendas of 
independent scientists or as a result of information and reporting 
requirements established or promoted by regulatory programs.11  
While scientists likely understand that their own dispersed research 
projects may not be comprehensive, they may erroneously assume 
that existing federal regulations provide some comprehensive health 
protection and establish or support research and reporting programs 
designed to reveal and evaluate the worst environmental exposure 
risks.  They suppose this, of course, because it constitutes a scientific 
approach to understanding and controlling environmental risks.  But 
they suppose wrong. 
In truth, the legal system regulates health risks based on a 
multitude of factors, many of which are nonscientific and intrinsically 
political.  These factors often take precedence—by necessity—over 
scientific assessments of exposure risk.12  Most notably, regulatory 
 
 11. See, e.g., Faustman, supra note 6, at 19. 
 12. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 33-51(1992), (offering then-Judge Breyer’s views of some of the causes of 
distortions in the regulatory process that may lead to irrational, incomplete, and inefficient 
regulation of health risks). 
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coverage is a product of majoritarian politics, which often responds to 
heightened public concerns that are not rationally correlated to 
available scientific risk information.13  Inversely, the interest group 
machinations of our political process may result in under-regulation 
(or the complete absence of regulation) of real and compelling risks 
that fail to capture the public’s attention.  Without strong, 
majoritarian support for regulatory controls, there is often insufficient 
push to get federal legislation, or at least effective federal legislation, 
through the special interest-encumbered process.14 
Even when the political process is not relatively encumbered, 
either by irrational public outcry or disproportionate interest group 
influence, the response to known and substantial risks may fall short 
because constraints on the practical design of regulatory programs 
often mean that some significant health risks will fall through the 
legal safety net.  In the design of an effective regulatory system, the 
sources of exposure risk must be identifiable and capable of some 
controls and the proposed controls must be both affordable and 
enforceable.15  Thus, the fact that there is an elaborate regulatory 
infrastructure governing “air toxics” or “pesticides,” for example, 
does not necessarily signify comprehensive health protection.  
Instead, these elaborate programs may be limited to simply requiring 
industry to “do their economic best” in limiting pollution, or to label 
their hazardous products clearly enough to permit safe application 
(but not to guarantee it).  Moreover, some of our most 
comprehensive regulatory regimes exclude important sources or 
releases from coverage for a variety of practical or political reasons.16 
It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars have been able to 
generate data that suggest startling inconsistencies and inefficiencies 
in this country’s regulatory agenda.  Over the years, several 
influential studies have purported to demonstrate that the costs of 
regulation often far exceed the benefits, that there are more cost-
 
 13. See id. at 33-39 (discussing the disconnect between public perceptions of risk and actual 
risk); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV 
1, 55-64 (1995) (analyzing public perceptions of risk). 
 14. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
(2005) (evaluating in detail the dual phenomena of over-reaction and under-reaction, and the 
consequences for rational risk regulation); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural 
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (critiquing Sunstein’s analysis). 
 15. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
 16. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 
1981 (1998). 
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effective ways to accomplish the same results, and that the system (or 
lack thereof) for setting regulatory priorities generates bizarre and 
inexplicable results.17  In response, legal scholars have proposed a 
multitude of regulatory reforms.  For example, Justice Stephen 
Breyer proposed the creation of a centralized, powerful, prestigious, 
politically insulated, and highly specialized group of civil servants 
charged with the task of rationalizing our risk regulation enterprise.18  
Professors Pildes and Sunstein responded with proposals to 
rationalize regulatory priority setting without sacrificing democratic 
participatory values,19 and Professor Sunstein has recently elaborated 
on those proposals.20  Similarly, Congress21 and the Executive22 have 
adopted reforms intended to limit the implementation of regulations 
that cannot be justified in cost-benefit terms, to encourage 
coordination among agencies in establishing regulatory priorities, and 
to promote rational regulatory priority setting within and among 
agencies. 
There has been much debate over the accuracy and usefulness of 
the studies that prompted these reforms23 and the value of the reforms 
 
 17. See Parker, supra note 1. 
 18. BREYER, supra note 12, 59-63. 
 19. Pildes and Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 13, 86-129. 
 20. Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 14. 
 21. See generally Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (2000)) (requiring that agencies perform 
quantitative and qualitative cost-benefit analysis before proposing or promulgating any 
significant rule); Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 
Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601, 801-8 (2000)) (providing for congressional 
review of all major regulations issued by government agencies with the possibility of joint 
resolution override); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 
107 Stat. 285 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-9 (2000)) (requiring agencies to develop multi-year 
strategic plans along with annual performance plans and reports). 
 22. The most notable examples are the Executive Orders signed by every President since 
Jimmy Carter that require some form of centralized oversight of regulatory priority setting and 
regulatory effectiveness.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (establishing the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and 
Budget).  In Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), which replaced Executive Order 
No. 12,044, President Reagan consolidated and strengthened OIRA’s oversight authority.  
While President George H.W. Bush relied on the Council on Competitiveness (headed by Vice 
President Dan Quayle) to serve OIRA’s centralized regulatory oversight role, both Presidents 
Clinton and George W. Bush revived OIRA and its focus on rationalizing regulatory decisions.  
For a review of the historical role of OIRA, see John R. Graham, Paul R. Noe, and Elizabeth L. 
Branch, Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 955-65 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
COST OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2003); Heinzerling, supra note 16; 
Parker, supra note 1. 
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themselves.24  While we tend to agree that the critics of these studies 
have the better of the argument, it is not our intent to join this debate 
in this paper.  Rather, we offer another critique of the power of these 
studies to guide effective and efficient regulatory reform, premised on 
the systematic failure of these studies to realize that existing scientific 
evidence of exposure risk may not provide the only justification for 
efficient regulation. 
II.  THE TRIAGE APPROACH: LEGAL GAPS AND SCARY SNAPSHOTS 
It is our contention that existing scientific data, such as the data 
underlying the reform-generating studies discussed above, can 
provide only part of the justification for regulatory action in any 
rational system of setting regulatory priorities.25  This is so because 
scientific research agendas are not the product of a coherent, rational, 
efficient process designed to identify the worst environmental 
exposure risks and comparatively rate the rest.26  Important 
information gaps exist, and the existence of these gaps undermines 
the claims by reformists that regulatory priorities should be 
established to maximize the value of regulations based on existing 
science.27  Importantly, health and safety laws not only regulate risks, 
they also provide powerful incentives and often establish the 
 
 24. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006) (challenging the conventional view that agencies are 
prone to inefficient and overzealous regulation and that centralized oversight can remedy these 
problems). 
 25. Several legal scholars have persuasively argued that cost-benefit analysis of 
environmental regulations is inherently flawed because the benefits of such regulations are 
difficult to quantify and therefore systematically under-valued.  Our argument is related to, but 
distinct from, this point.  See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN AND HEINZERLING, supra note 23, 
passim (2003) (making the case against cost-benefit analysis in environmental, health, and safety 
regulation); see also, Richard W, Parker, Grading the Government 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343, 
1381-1414 (assessing the systematic undervaluation of health and safety benefits in cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 26. It is important to note that we are not suggesting that such an agenda setting 
mechanism should exist.  We are simply observing that scientific evidence generated by 
individuated research agendas and responding to various uncoordinated incentives cannot be 
counted on to produce comprehensive comparative risk information. 
 27. Of course, some reformists recognize that efficiency and cost-effectiveness are starting 
points for regulatory reform, and that value judgments must follow the technocratic scientific 
evaluation.  See e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking  Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
109 YALE L. REV. 165 (1999) (advocating widespread use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate 
competing policies, but recognizing that its conclusions will be only one component of reasoned 
governmental choice).  Our contention is different, however.  We argue that there should be 
room in the scientific assessments for a methodology that begins from premises other than 
existing scientific information. 
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mechanisms for generating more information to assist in the 
regulatory enterprise.28  Legal requirements and associated regulatory 
programs are responsible for demanding and often financing a great 
deal of applied research that is then available to scientists and to 
regulators to fine-tune the regulatory program.29  In the absence of 
regulation, substantial risks may remain unexamined and large data 
gaps may develop.30  In this way, legal blind spots become scientific 
ones.  As the D.C. Circuit noted in a slightly different but related 
setting, “[a]n exemption [to regulation] tends to become indefinite: 
the problem drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be 
recalled in the absence of crisis or a strong political protagonist.”31 
Thus, we propose a triage-type mechanism for identifying 
regulatory priorities that arises from the premise that what we don’t 
know can hurt us.  Our approach has three parts.  First, we focus 
exclusively on those regulatory programs that offer no health-based 
protection for at least one important environmental vector of risks to 
children’s health, either because they exclude this risk entirely or 
because the protection offered is based on nonscientific factors like 
technological feasibility.  We then confirm that the programs do not 
provide any requirements or incentives for monitoring and continued 
data collection.32  Finally, we look for the limited “scientific 
snapshots” of scientific research or even baseline monitoring that do 
exist in the scientific literature to verify that children could be at 
heightened risk from these regulatory gaps.  When these three factors 
align, then we have found a blind spot in the protection of children’s 
 
 28. For example, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initially adopted its 
regulation requiring the removal of most of the lead from gasoline in the 1970s, very little was 
known for certain about the health consequences of lead exposure.  Only after a decade of 
unleaded gasoline use did scientists have sufficient data to demonstrate substantial benefits of 
the concomitant reductions in blood lead levels, especially in children.  See Frank Ackerman, 
Lisa Heinzerling, & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 160-71 (2005) (examining 
the decision to remove lead from gasoline and its consequences). 
 29. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should 
Bridge the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: 
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 261-62 (Wendy Wagner & 
Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) (applying the supply/demand framework for understanding the 
interaction between legislation and information production). 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 257-59 (discussing one data gap). 
 31. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 32. Although it is usually the case that where there is no federal science-based regulatory 
program, there is also no ambient monitoring or system of collecting information about the 
nature or extent of contamination, that is not always the case. See generally Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000). 
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health that we argue deserves further investigation and perhaps 
regulatory response. 
We hasten to add that the risks arising in these legal blind spots 
are not the only and may not be the most significant environmental 
threats to children’s health.  There is strong evidence of other, 
serious, quantified risks to children’s health that remain, 
notwithstanding the existence of relatively comprehensive regulatory 
programs.33  Nevertheless, we believe that the legal blind spots we 
identify may be of greater urgency because the lack of regulatory 
oversight means that there are no requirements or incentives for data 
collection or scientific analysis. 
Therein lies the broader implication of our approach.  It is our 
contention that in any attempt to prioritize and rationalize the 
national regulatory agenda, identifying large gaps in legal protection 
may be just as important as working from the available scientific 
information.  Because legal protections both respond to and generate 
scientific evidence of important risks, using existing information to 
justify legal responses is only half of any logical agenda setting 
methodology.  Our approach provides a crucial missing piece to the 
regulatory reform puzzle. 
III.  APPLYING THE TRIAGE APPROACH: POCKETS OF UNDER 
PROTECTION AND GREAT UNCERTAINTY 
Based on an inventory of the federal regulatory programs, we 
identify three and potentially more areas where regulations do not 
even pretend to be protective of public health, but where child 
exposure to risks might be substantial.  Consistent with our criteria, 
these programs not only provide theoretically inadequate protection 
to most persons, particularly children, living in “hot spot” 
communities, but they also produce no incentives or requirements for 
measuring ambient exposures.  As a result, the problems tend to fall 
through the legal and scientific cracks. 
A. Air Toxics in “Hot Spot Areas” 
The under-regulation of the emission of air toxins and the 
resulting existence of air toxic hot spots provide a compelling 
 
 33. This is particularly true of health risks to children that result from exposure to ozone in 
the ambient air, a pollutant that is relatively heavily regulated.  See generally Committee on 
Environmental Health, Ambient Air Pollution: Health Hazards to Children, 114 PEDIATRICS 
1699 (2004) (sources omitted). 
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example of a regulatory gap that may be contributing to serious risks 
to child health.  Air toxins are regulated through technology-based 
controls.34  This regulatory mechanism ensures only that each major 
source has done its economic and technological best (as determined 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) to prevent 
pollution, not that significant risks to public health are averted.35  As a 
result, industrial sources of air toxins often emit levels of air toxins 
that far exceed what might be considered “protective” (usually a one 
in one million standard) based on risk assessments, even when they 
are in compliance with applicable regulatory standards.36  In some 
instances, moreover, industrial sources appear to be in violation of 
even these science-blind, emission control requirements.37  The most 
common violations result from repeated “upsets” or high bursts of 
polluting activity that arise from pollution control equipment 
malfunctions and related causes.38  Scientists studying air quality in 
Houston, for example, discovered that concentrations of ozone were 
as much as three times higher than the levels that would be predicted 
based on the levels of pollution that had been permitted for the area, 
an observation they attributed to high bursts of pollution (or spikes) 
in industrial emissions.39  To make matters worse, many large 
industrial sources are commonly located together in “complexes” or 
“industrial corridors.”40  These corridors concentrate large vehicular 
 
 34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000) (motor vehicle emissions standards). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000); but see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2000).  Although EPA is 
required to set residual standards for air toxins that present greater than a one in one million 
cancer risk after technology-based standards have implemented, EPA has moved very slowly on 
these “residual risk” standards and still sets them on a source-by-source basis. See, e.g., E. 
Donald Elliott & Alexander Schmandt, Recent Clean Air Act Developments, ALI-ABA 
Course of Study, February 16-18, 2005, SK058 ALI-ABA 103, 115 (2005) (noting how EPA has 
proposed residual risk standards for only one source of air toxics— coke oven batteries); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
 36. See generally Victor Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal 
Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation 10-12 (2006) (draft, on file with authors) (observing this 
problem and discussing Congress’ effort to address it through the residual risk program). 
 37. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Karen Sokol, Man-Made Disaster: Texas’s Failure to 
Protect its Citizens from the Perils of the Houston Petrochemical Complex, CPR WHITE PAPER, 
Sept. 2006, at 8-11, available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/HPC_605.pdf. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 8-9. 
 39. See David Allen et al., Accelerated Science Evaluation of Ozone Formation in the 
Houston-Galveston Area 7-8, 17-18 (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.utexas.edu/research/ceer/ 
texaqsarchive/accel_science_eval.PDF. 
 40. See, e.g., McGarity & Sokol, supra note 37, at 2-3. 
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traffic serving the industrial clusters in one area, which contributes to 
the elevated levels of hazardous air pollutants.41 
Congress anticipated that technology based standards were likely 
to fall short of the protective measures warranted by the risks of 
exposure to air toxins, and accordingly required EPA to assess the 
remaining health risks from air toxins after the technology-based 
controls were implemented.42  Congress also required EPA to devise a 
strategy for addressing residual health risks, particularly in urban 
areas.43  Unfortunately, EPA has made little progress addressing air 
toxins that accumulate additively in “hot spots” that could threaten 
public health.44 
Because regulation of air toxins is not yet based on health-
protective goals or measures, the federal regulatory program 
governing air toxics does not require monitoring of individual toxins 
either in the ambient air or at the point of their emission from stacks 
or fugitive sources.  As long as the pollution control technology is in 
place and appears to be functioning, the source is presumed to be in 
compliance.45  Ambient levels are thus effectively irrelevant to the 
regulatory scheme.  Not surprisingly, then, U.S. EPA and most states 
have given little attention to monitoring the ambient air for air toxics 
or taking measures to ensure that the public is adequately protected.46  
Moreover, the ambient data that is collected is of questionable 
 
 41. See, e.g., Committee on Environmental Health, supra note 33. 
 42. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000). 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k) (2000). 
 44. EPA has completed a Report to Congress, published in 1999, that contains “EPA’s 
general framework for assessing risks to public health or the environment.”  EPA, RESIDUAL 
RISK REPORT TO CONGRESS ES-12 (March 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ 
oarpg/t3/reports/risk_rep.pdf.  EPA is also in the process of promulgating emissions standards 
for individual categories of sources. See EPA, Charge to the Environmental Models 
Subcommittee of the SAB (2006), http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/nata/sab_charge7.html (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2007).  In its large air toxics modeling project discussed infra at note 67 and 
accompanying text, EPA does identify the “next steps” that flow from the assessment.  See 
EPA’s Use of Results (2006), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata/ur.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2007).  This explanation does not provide information on EPA’s progress on any of the goals, 
however, and they are not cross-referenced in EPA’s Residual risk webpage. 
 45. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 63.120(a) (2006) (visual inspections are required only once 
annually for storage vessels); see generally Lynn Blais, Thomas McGarity & Wendy Wagner, 
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CONCENTRATIONS OF TOXIC POLLUTION IN TEXAS: A REPORT TO 
THE TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 25-26 (Feb. 2003) (on file with authors). 
 46. See generally McGarity & Wagner, supra note 45. 
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quality, in part because of its inability to detect low quantities of 
toxins and in part because of imprudent placement of the monitors.47 
Perhaps even more disturbing, there is often no regulatory 
infrastructure in place to process ambient air quality data, even when 
relatively high quality data is available.  There are no official federal 
standards for “safe” levels of ambient air toxins, and “soft” limits are 
in place only for some of the listed federal air toxins.48  As of 1998, 
EPA had provided cancer benchmark concentrations (“safe 
concentrations” leading to only a one in one million cancer risk) for 
less than eighty percent of the listed hazardous air pollutants and 
non-cancer benchmark concentrations for about half.49  Moreover, 
these benchmark concentrations are based on what is needed to 
protect an average adult (a 154 pound adult who is exposed for 
seventy years),50 not children.  There is also insufficient knowledge of 
synergistic reactions between multiple air toxics; at best, the risks 
posed by individual toxins are added together.51  In some states, 
however, even this simple calculation is not made.  In a study of a 
“hot spots” of 1,3-butadiene in Scotlandville, Louisiana, for example, 
the State did not even attempt to account for the additive risks posed 
by all of the air toxics combined in deciding that no further action was 
needed, even though the aggregate concentrations of these toxic 
pollutants were high, particularly in the “strike samples” that take 
worst case measurements.52 See Table 1.   
 
 47. See, e.g., Amy D. Kyle NM., Evaluating the Health Significance of Hazardous Air 
Pollutants Using Monitoring Data, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 32, 42 (2001); Tracey J. Woodruff et 
al., Public Health Implications of 1990 Air Toxics Concentrations across the United States, 106 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 245, 245 (1998); McGarity & Sokol, supra note 37, at 3. 
 48. See, e.g., EPA’s Health Criteria for Air Toxics, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/ 
nata/nettables.pdf; Minimum Risk Levels (MRLs) for Hazardous Substances, Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ASTDR) (2007), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ 
mrls.html; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION, POTTSTOWN AREA AIR MONITORING, 9, 21-22 (May 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/aq/toxics/projects/pottstown/pottstown_report
.pdf [hereinafter Pennsylvania Pottstown report]. 
 49. See, e.g., Woodruff et al., supra note 47, at *; Kyle, supra note 47, at 42. 
 50. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pottstown Report, supra note 48, at 9. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 10. 
 52. See, e.g., LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FINAL AIR 
MONITORING REPORT FOR THE SOUTH SCOTLANDVILLE AIR TOXICS MONITORING PROJECT 9 
(Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/LinkClick.aspx?link=Air 
QualityAssessment%2fSouth+scotlandville+final.pdf [hereinafter referred to at the Louisiana 
Scotlandville Report]. 
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The State’s failure to consider cumulative concentrations is 
particularly worrisome since the State adopted protective health 
levels that were 40 times less protective for benzene (EPA’s level is 
0.09 ppb)53 and 260 times less protective for 1,3-butadiene (EPA’s 
level is 0.016)54 than the benchmark levels recommended by EPA. 
In most states there is also no ready regulatory response if levels 
in ambient air exceed “safe” levels.  As a technical matter, it can be 
difficult for a state regulator to isolate the source(s) of the 
 
 53. Louisiana’s standard is 3.76 ppb, id. at 8.  EPA’s recommended standard is .09 ppb, 
Kyle et al., supra note 47, at 40. 
 54. Lousiana’s standard is .42 ppm, Louisiana Scotlandville Report, supra note 52, at 9.  
EPA’s recommended standard is .0016.  Kyle et al., supra note 47, at 40. 
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problematic emissions.55  Multiple sources, including transportation, 
can contribute to high concentrations of air toxins in ambient air.56  
Even more problematic, if the sources appear to be in compliance 
with their permits (or there is no evidence to the contrary), states may 
believe they do not have regulatory authority to take action or may 
lack the political capital to push existing enforcement authorities in 
creative ways.57  In Texas, for example, the State believes it must 
determine that air toxic concentrations significantly threaten public 
health before they can demand sources to limit their emissions of a 
problematic substance below permitted levels.58  Indeed, perceived 
limits in existing regulatory authority may only increase the tendency 
of U.S. EPA and states to remain ignorant of ambient levels of air 
toxins in the environment, as well as what those levels might mean in 
terms of health impacts. 
Despite these multiple science-law impediments, a number of 
states are in the process of developing programs that attempt at least 
to begin to engage in an analysis of potential health threats through 
targeted monitoring of air toxins.59  An EPA website posts air toxics 
monitoring data for the states,60 although since most states do not 
have comprehensive monitoring programs the usefulness of this site is 
limited.61  Even in states where the monitoring is more extensive, 
however, regulators appear at least partly hamstrung in taking 
regulatory action to address high levels of air toxins.  In an 
assessment of the risks of air toxins in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, for 
example, state regulators discovered high levels of TCE in the 
ambient air based on stationary monitors positioned in the town and 
 
 55. See Louisiana Scotlandville Report, supra note 52, at 8-9. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 8 (attributing almost half of the high benzene concentrations to mobile 
sources). 
 57. This is not always the case, however.  In initial research on Scotlandtown, the State 
found very high levels of 1,3-butadiene that it apparently linked to stationary industrial sources.  
It took administrative action against fifteen of the sources and required them to engage in 
fenceline monitoring and the levels decreased (although as mentioned earlier perhaps not to 
levels that EPA would consider “safe”).  Lousiana Scotlandville Report, supra note 52, at 6. 
 58. See, e.g., Blais, McGarity, & Wagner, supra note 45, at 15-26 (describing the limitations 
in Texas’s authority to address high concentrations of urban air toxics). 
 59. Connecticut, for example, promulgated protective standards for these contaminants in 
the 1980s and developed a monitoring system in the late 1990s to determine whether there are 
significant exceedances in the state worthy of further regulatory action. See, e.g., Nescaum, Data 
Analysis of Air Toxics in Connecticut (Mar. 1, 2005), at 1-1 to 1-3, available at 
http://www.nescaum.org/topics/air-toxics-monitoring. 
 60. See EPA Database, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/wks/fs_monitoring.pdf. 
 61. See, e.g., McGarity & Sokol, supra note 37, at 3. 
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at the high school, presenting an excess risk of about 1.6 in 10,000 of 
cancer to adult residents and, when considering all toxins combined, 
about a two in 10,000 risk of cancer.62  The regulators decided not to 
take regulatory action because the State Health Department 
determined that this was not a health risk of significance and because 
the TCE concentrations had been dropping over two years.63  
Curiously absent from the report is any mention of the type of action 
that the State would have taken against the diverse sources of TCE 
had it determined that a two in 10,000 risk of cancer to an adult was a 
risk worthy of concern.64 The State of Texas has identified similarly 
high levels of air toxins in some areas,65 yet as mentioned, it seem to 
believe it lacks the regulatory authority to require sources to reduce 
pollutants if they are in compliance with their permits.66 
The scientific snapshots reinforce concerns about excessive risks 
to children from exposure to toxic air pollutants.  The most 
comprehensive estimate of possible risks comes from an EPA study 
that modeled emissions data from the Toxic Release Inventory.67  
EPA’s study predicts that in 1996 more than 200 million people in the 
U.S. face an upper-bound lifetime cancer risk of greater than one in 
100,000 and 20 million people face risks greater than one in 10,000 
due to their exposure to air toxics.68  Other studies produce similarly 
worrisome projections.  One study reaffirms EPA’s conclusion that 
“concentrations of pollutants in many counties . . . would exceed 
health benchmarks [of a one in 1 million risk]”69 while another study 
 
 62. See Pennsylvania Pottsville Report, supra note 48, at 9-10. 
 63. Id. at 11. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., McGarity & Sokol, supra note 37, at 2; see also Dina Capiello, In Harm’s Way, 
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, January 16, 2005. 
 66. This is based on the authors’ communications with the Texas Council for 
Environmental Quality.  The TCEQ commissioned a study from the authors (and Prof. 
McGarity) that sought recommendations for how they might respond to the problem of air 
toxins in the State; although the study was presented in 2002 and finalized in 2003, no action by 
the State legislature or the TCEQ has been taken. 
 67. The method for the model is explained by the EPA. EPA, Overview: The 4 Steps, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata/4steps.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
 68. See EPA, Summary of Results (1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/ 
nata/risksum.html.  Maps can also be constructed on command to estimate “rough” risk levels 
and concentrations in counties and states. See, e.g., The Risk Maps, http://www.epa.gov/ 
ttn/atw/nata/maprisk.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
 69. See, e.g., Kyle et al., supra note 47, at 33. 
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summarizes the frequency of predicted exceedances by chemical 













With the help of robust ambient monitoring data in the State of 
California, researchers found that the risks of cancer in adults were as 
high as 2-3 in 10,000 for certain areas of the State, an increase that 
could lead to 8,600 increased lifetime cancer cases.71  In the State of 
Minnesota, using a combination of monitoring and modeling, the 
highest cancer risks were estimated at 2.7 in 100,000 for specific, 
affected areas, a risk that the researchers concluded was serious 
enough to warrant further scientific and regulatory attention.72 
Because children’s lungs continue to develop postnatally, there is 
reason to believe that they are particularly vulnerable to exposures to 
air toxins.73  Indeed, the few existing studies of childhood exposure to 
air pollutants reveal that those children who live in polluted areas 
with heavy concentrations of particulates have decreased lung 
function and lung growth.74  Some birth defects and infant mortality 
have even been associated with high particulate concentrations.75  
“Increased respiratory tract complications in children (e.g., wheezing, 
chronic productive cough, and asthma hospitalizations) have [also] 
been associated with residence near areas of high traffic density 
 
 70. Table 2 is taken from Woodruff et al., supra note 49. 
 71. Rachel A. Morello-Frosch et al., Air Toxics and Health Risks in California: The Public 
Health Implications of Outdoor Concentrations, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 273, 273 (2000). 
 72. P.G. Pratt et al., An Assessment of Air Toxics in Minnesota, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 815, 821 (2000). 
 73. See Committee on Environmental Health, supra note 33, at 1699. 
 74. See id. at 1701. 
 75. See id. 
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(particularly truck traffic).  Other investigators have linked various 
childhood cancers to proximity to traffic.”76  Unfortunately, however, 
because there are comparatively few studies on the effects of air 
toxics exposure on children, the full extent of the public health crisis 
resulting from air toxics “hot spots” is unknown. 
B. Ambient pesticide exposures 
A second environmental threat to children’s health occurs as a 
result of the gaps in the regulatory oversight of pesticide use.  As a 
result of the Food Quality Protection Act, substantial public attention 
has been focused on examining and limiting the residue of pesticides 
on food and accounting for the particular susceptibility of children in 
setting these pesticide residue standards.77  While the implementation 
of the Food Quality Protection Act has been disappointing,78 the 
program nevertheless has made some notable progress in limiting 
children’s exposures to pesticides in food.79 
The actual environmental application and use of these pesticides, 
however, is not regulated at all at the federal level.  While FIFRA 
mandates federal review and approval of pesticide labeling, and, in 
theory, compliance with labeling requirements during application,80 
the actual regulation of the use of pesticides is left to the states.81  
With the exception of some limited school- or application-specific 
requirements, however, states have not stepped in to fill this 
regulatory gap.82  As a consequence, a great deal of pesticides can be 
used in unsafe ways and in higher concentrations than expected or 
needed.83 
 
 76. Id. at 1702. 
 77. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000). 
 78. See Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s 
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 147-202 (2001). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPLEMENTING THE FOOD 
QUALITY PROTECTION ACT: PROGRESS REPORT 35 (Aug. 1999), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/laws/fqpa/fqpareport.pdf [hereinafter FQPA Progress 
Report]. 
 80. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2000). 
 81. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000). 
 82. Our focus on environmental exposures sets aside the high incidence of accidental 
poisonings due to pesticides, which is a concern in and of itself.  See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, PESTICIDES AND CHILD SAFETY, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/ 
factsheets/childsaf.htm (last visited Feb. 8,  2007). 
 83. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 392-406 
(arguing that “pesticide regulation is not. . . a body of law that addresses in any strategic way the 
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Even when used as directed, however, there is no guarantee that 
children or adult family members will be adequately protected from 
excess risk resulting from exposure to pesticides.  Under the U.S. 
pesticide licensing program, pesticides are restricted or banned only if 
EPA finds that they ““cause unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment,”84 a determination that involves a cost-benefit analysis 
that weighs the benefits of the pesticide against the risks.85  In making 
this calculation, EPA does not require manufacturers to show either 
the efficacy of the pesticide or the lack of the availability of safer 
substitutes; pesticides are viewed in isolation and assumed to be 
efficacious.86  Moreover, since many pesticides were on the market 
when FIFRA was enacted in 1976, older pesticides have received only 
limited, after-the-fact regulatory oversight, with correspondingly 
limited toxicity testing to evaluate their safety.87  Even for new, more 
thoroughly tested pesticides, screening for important risks to children 
is limited.88  In their review article on pesticides and children, 
Landrigan et al. list four deficiencies in current testing requirements 
for pesticides used by EPA that—even seven years after the article 
was published—seem to remain largely in place.89  First, EPA does 
not routinely require full-scale neurodevelopmental toxicity testing, 
even for neurotoxic pesticides.90  Although some of these testing 
 
underlying prevalence of pesticides in American agriculture, nor is it a body of law designed to 
minimize pesticide use.”). 
 84. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (2000). 
 85. See, Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-
pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q., 105, 161-62 
(2006). 
 86. See  id. at 163. 
 87. See id. at 166-67; see also John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: 
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 313-14 
(1991). 
 88. “For the first time, EPA is requiring additional studies on pesticides to better 
understand their effects on children specifically (developmental neurotoxicity, acute and 
subchronic neurotoxicity). In addition, EPA has developed new tests and risk assessment 
methods to target the factors unique to infants and children.” U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM PESTICIDES (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/kidpesticide.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007). 
 89. See Philip J. Landrigan et al., Pesticides and Inner-City Children: Exposures, Risks, and 
Prevention, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPP. 431, 435-36 (1999).  Although Landrigan et al.’s 
article was published in 1999, the dates of the protocols posted on EPA’s website indicates that 
most, if not all, of the protocols Landrigan et al. were criticizing were published in 1998 or 
earlier.  See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OPPTS SERIES 870 TEST 
GUIDELINES, available at http://www.epa.gov/opptsfrs/publications/OPPTS_Harmonized/870_ 
Health_Effects_Test_Guidelines/Master/870final.pdf. 
 90. Landrigan et al., supra note 89, at 435. 
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guidelines technically exist, there is “wide flexibility” in when they 
are required.91  Second, most of the tests are performed only on adult 
animals, even though there is evidence that some toxic effects cannot 
be assessed on adult animals alone, particularly for neurotic effects.92  
Third, the testing that is done on infant animals does not follow them 
over the duration of a lifetime even though there is evidence that 
some pesticides have degenerative effects that occur later in life.93  
Finally, EPA requires only a few tests that explore possible adverse 
effects of pesticides n the immune system or on their potential to 
disrupt the endocrine system.94 
The “scientific snapshots” of potential risks from the use of 
pesticides, like air toxics, is worrisome.  In agricultural areas, pesticide 
residues in the dust in homes of farmers can be quite high, a fact that 
is attributed in part to “take home” contributions,95 although 
researchers are still debating the health significance of this finding for 
children.96  Some studies also identify a higher increased risk of a 
variety of tumors and cancers in families of farm works.97 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 436. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Curl et al., Evaluation of Take-Home Organophosphorus Pesticide 
Exposure Among Agricultural Workers and Their Children, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 787, 
790 (2002); Chensheng Lu et al., Pesticide Exposure of Children in an Agricultural Community: 
Evidence of Household Proximity to Farmland and Take Home Exposure Pathways, 84 ENVTL. 
RESEARCH 290, 298 (2000); Nancy J. Simcox et al., Pesticides in Household Dust and Soil: 
Exposure Pathways for Children of Agricultural Families, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1126, 
1131-32 (1995). 
 96. Researchers in one study, for example, did not detect higher pesticide concentration 
residues in the urine of children when the dust levels in their homes were as much as four times 
higher. Richard A. Fenske et al., Children’s Exposure to Chlorpyrifos and Parathion in an 
Agricultural Community in Central Washington State, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 549, 551-52 
(2002).  In another study researchers did not detect significant correlations between pesticide 
residues in the home and the incidence of non-Hodgkins lymphoma: the residues were just as 
high in homes with persons without lymphoma.  Mary H. Ward et al., Proximity to Crops and 
Residential Exposure to Agricultural Herbicides in Iowa, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 893, 896-
97 (2006). 
 97. See generally Shelia H. Zahm & Mary H. Ward, Pesticides and Childhood Cancer, 106 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPP. 893 (1998).  The EPA is currently sponsoring various studies of 
pesticide exposures of children on the U.S.-Mexico border.  These include a study to assess 
educational methods to reduce exposure, another study to examine methods for measuring 
neurotoxic effects in small children, and a longitudinal study measuring residues in the residue 
of children living on the border. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S.-
MEXICO BORDER 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH WORKGROUP, http://www.epa.gov/ehwg/ 
projects_publications.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).  EPA is also supporting a project 
measuring “take home” exposure in agricultural areas of Washington.  See U.S. 
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However, child exposure to pesticides may actually be highest in 
urban areas, where pesticides are used liberally to control household 
pests.  Pesticide use records reveal that more pesticides are used in 
urban areas than agricultural areas, and in the urban setting, far more 
of the use occurs inside rather than outside the home.98 
Heavy applications of pesticides have been required in inner-city 
neighborhoods because of the age and poor maintenance of the 
urban housing stock.  The resulting heavy exposure of inner-city 
children to pesticides is therefore a direct consequence of poverty, 
overcrowding, and poor housing and must therefore be viewed as 
yet another manifestation of the environmental injustice that these 
children suffer.99 
In one study, researchers found that “[t]he number of gallons of 
chlorpyrifos [used to control fleas, termites, and roaches] applied in 
Manhattan exceeded the total number of gallons of all pesticides 
applied in any other single county.”100  They further found that 
pesticide use in Harlem not only included high quantities of these two 
lethal pesticides (chlorphyrifos and organochlorine pesticides), but 
also illegal “street” pesticides.101  In a study of poor minority women 
living in or near New York City, “85% of the women report that pest 
control measures were used in the home during pregnancy” and “at 
least four pesticides [were detected] in the personal air samples of all 
women monitored during the third trimester.”102  In fact, the poorer 
the household, the greater the pest risks and the greater the use of 
pest control measures.103  Another study similarly identified relatively 
high levels of pesticide exposure to pregnant women in New York 
City.104  This worrisome picture of pesticide use is not necessarily 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROTECTING CHILDREN, http://www.epa.gov/ 
pesticides/health/children.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 98. See Landrigan et al., supra note 89, at 431. 
 99. Id. at 436. 
 100. Id. at 432. 
 101. Id. at 432-33. 
 102. Robin Whyatt et al., Residential Pesticide Use During Pregnancy Among a Cohort of 
Urban Minority Women, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 507, 512 (2002); see also id. at 513 
(pointing out that only inhalation routes of exposure were considered even though there are 
other routes of exposure to household pesticides, including unintentional ingestion). 
 103. Id. at 510, 513. 
 104. See Gertrud S. Berkowitz, Exposure to Indoor Pesticides During Pregnancy in a 
Multiethnic, Urban Cohort, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 79, 82-83 (2003).  In that study, the 
reports of pesticide use did not correlate with pesticide levels in the urine, although the authors 
explain why at least the metabolite data may not be indicative of exposure. The study also found 
that a higher incidence of pesticide use by a household member was correlated with lower 
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unexpected, but it is disturbing because of the adverse effects that 
result from uncontrolled pests: The scientific literature suggests a 
higher incidence of childhood asthma with exposure to cockroaches, 
for example.105 
As with air toxins, children are much more vulnerable to dangers 
posed by widespread unregulated use of pesticides than adults.  First, 
the level of exposure to pesticide residues in household dust and 
other media are typically much higher for children than for adults 
since pesticides collect in plush toys, carpet, and dust which are not 
only more likely to be inhaled, but are in fact regularly ingested by 
children.106  Children also have much higher biological vulnerability to 
pesticides than their adult counterparts.107  Because their metabolic 
functions are still developing, they are unable to rid their bodies of 
pesticides in the ways that adults can.108  Moreover, their development 
processes, which are more active than adults, can become easily 
disrupted and the adverse effects can be irreversible.109  Of greatest 
concern for children, however, are the wide range of toxic effects, 
which include impacts on endocrine function, reproductive function, 
metabolic functions, and cognitive functioning.  “There is evidence, 
for example, that pre- and postnatal [sic] exposures to pesticides 
increase risk of childhood cancer, and concern has arisen that early 
exposure to neurotoxic pesticides may increase risk in later life of 
chronic neurological diseases such as dementia, Parkinson’s disease, 
and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.”110  Exposure to some pesticides 
during gestation or the early postnatal period reveals adverse 
neurological development in the children.111 
However, as the scientists writing the review articles and 
conducting individual studies readily concede, far more is not known 
about exposure to pesticides in the environment than is known and 
there is a compelling need for additional research.112  This blind spot 
 
education or minority status, although all women reported similar levels of pesticide use when 
the applicator included a third party. Id. at 81, tbl. 4. 
 105. See, e.g., Peyton A. Eggleston et al., The Environment and Asthma in U.S. Inner Cities, 
107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPP. 439, 441 (1999) (describing this literature). 
 106. Landrigan et al., supra note 89, at 433. 
 107. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS 
AND CHILDREN (1993). 
 108. E.g., Landrigan et al., supra note 89, at 434. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 434-35 (citations omitted). 
 111. E.g., Whyatt et al., supra note 102, at 507 (citing Landrigan et al., supra note 89). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 513-14; Zahm & Ward, supra note 97, at 905. 
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for environmental exposures again provides reason for concern; but, 
like air toxics, there is simply not enough data available to identify 
the extent of the risks or to identify the sub-areas or types of pesticide 
applications of greatest toxicological or exposure concern. 
C. Communities with Inadequate Sanitation or Contaminated 
Drinking Water 
Most Americans are aware of the tragic consequences of 
waterborne illnesses plaguing developing countries.113  Many, 
however, would be shocked to realize the number of rural and poor 
American families that lack potable water supplies or adequate 
wastewater treatment infrastructure.114  Moreover, a recent study by 
the NRDC revealed that many American cities have old and 
dilapidated water treatment infrastructure, resulting in widespread 
risk of exposure to chemicals and pathogens even among city 
residents.115  Contaminated drinking water and lack of adequate 
sanitation are among the direst environmental risks that children can 
face. 
Nonetheless, federal environmental laws do virtually nothing to 
address health risks to families or small communities that rely on 
contaminated private wells or failing septic systems.  While the 
regulatory gap is explained in part by federalism based constitutional 
limits on the reach of federal regulation, the health consequences of 
the gap can be significant, particularly for children.  Inadequate 
wastewater services—like poorly built or inadequate private septic 
systems—create risk of exposure to dangerous pathogens like E. coli 
and the resulting threat of dysentery and other serious diseases.116  
 
 113. A recent article in THE NEW YORKER magazine covered the issue extensively.  See 
Michael  Spector, The Last Drop, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 2006, at 61-71.  See also Sharon 
Lafraniere, Sub-Saharan Africa Lags in Water Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A4. 
 114. A 2001 EPA survey of drinking water infrastructure needs identified huge numbers of 
U.S. citizens and residents who lack access to safe drinking water.  See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS SURVEY 53-56 (2001), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/needssurvey/pdfs/2001/report_needssurvey_2001.pdf 
(estimating that 16 million people in the U.S. get water from sources other than public water 
supply systems, and that the adequacy of the quantity and quality of this water cannot be 
comprehensively assessed due to lack of governmental oversight). 
 115. ERIK OLSON, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S ON TAP: GRADING DRINKING 
WATER IN US CITIES at v-vi (2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/uscities/ 
pdf/whatsontap.pdf. 
 116. E.g., JANE FRANKENBERGER, PURDUE EXTENSION SAFE WATER OFFICE, E. COLI 
AND INDIANA LAKES AND STREAMS, http://www.ecn.purdue.edu/SafeWater/watershed/ 
ecoli.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2007). 
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Children typically have higher exposure rates than adults because 
they spend more time outside, close to the contamination.117  At the 
same time, their immune systems are less developed and they are 
more susceptible to dehydration from exposure-related illnesses 
because of their small body size.118  Contaminated drinking water can 
also cause a wide range of adverse health effects, depending on the 
type of contamination.  While most of the concern is focused on 
residual contamination from applied toxics, like pesticides and 
chlorinated compounds, naturally occurring contaminants such as 
arsenic, nitrates, and even sodium, can cause long-term damage to 
digestive tracts and heart functioning.119  Again, given their low body 
weight, their high consumption of drinking water, and their generally 
heightened vulnerability to toxins because of their developing 
metabolism, children are likely to be at greater risk from 
contaminated drinking water than adults.120 
In a scientific sense, the problems of private well contamination 
and failed septics are far more straightforward than the problems 
posed by environmental pesticide exposure or air toxics.  
Nevertheless, in practice these problems are at least as resistant to 
reform because of the high costs involved in remediation.  For most 
of these environmental problems, the only recourse is to “upgrade” 
the septics or centralize the water supply, options which can be 
extremely costly, particularly for residents in rural areas that have 
 
 117. See, e.g., Children’s Environmental Health Network, An Introduction to the Field, 
supra note 5 (noting how children’s exposures to contamination on land can be higher than 
adults due to behavioral characteristics of young children which include more time close to the 
ground, more hand-to-mouth activity, and more time outdoors). 
 118. U.S. National Library of Medicine,Dehydration, MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia 
(Jun. 13, 2006), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000982.htm 
 119. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. BRADSHAW & G. MORGAN POWELL, KANSAS STATE 
UNIVERSITY, SODIUM IN DRINKING WATER (2002), available at http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/ 
library/h20ql2/MF1094.PDF; see also BERNARD T. NOLAN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., MOVING 
FROM MONITORING TO PREDICTION: NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF NITRATE IN GROUNDWATER 
(2005), available at http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/briefing_sheet3.pdf. 
 120. For example, children under six months old who are fed formula mixed with water 
contaminated with high levels of nitrates may develop “blue baby syndrome” or 
methemoglobinemia, which if left untreated can progress rapidly to coma and death.  See Lynda 
Knobeloch et al., Blue Babies and Nitrate-Contaminated Well Water, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 675, 675-78 (2000).  See also BRIAN A. COHEN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, JUST 
ADD WATER (1996), available at http://www.ewg.org/reports/JustAddWater/SDWA.html 
(describing infants’ increased vulnerability and higher consumption of fluids relative to their 
weight). 
04__WAGNER_BLAIS.DOC 8/17/2007  9:23 AM 
272 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:249 
settled in substandard conditions precisely because of the low cost of 
living.121 
Since the options for improved health effectively require either 
extremely expensive upgrades or centralized services, some state and 
local governments with jurisdiction over these problems actively 
avoid inspections, particularly in poor communities.122  Enforcement 
of septic requirements in most locales could require violators to 
install new septic systems.123  With a price tag ranging from several 
thousand to even ten thousand dollars for remediating a failing septic 
or contaminated well at a single residence, the price of fixing these 
health threats may exceed the value of the land and home combined, 
and in any event often prove beyond the reach of many of the 
residents who face these risks.  Precisely because regulators do tend 
to turn a blind eye towards the problems, however, there is generally 
no effort to monitor for the risks nor is there an attempt to provide 
education about the risks.  In at least one community, in fact, the 
county deliberately avoided monitoring overflowing septic systems 
and told residents that the systems were safe so that the county 
sanitarian would not be forced to take enforcement action, which may 
have required evicting residents from their property if they were 
unable to correct the problem.124 
 
 121. See Lemos M C, Austin D, Merideth R, Varady R G, 2002, Public - Private 
Partnerships as Ccatalysts for Community-based Water Infrastructure Development: The Border 
WaterWorks Program in Texas and New Mexico Colonias,  20 ENV’T & PLAN. C GOV’T & POL’Y 
281 (2002). 
 122. For example, the Texas Office of the Attorney General sued Maverick County in 1993 
for its lax enforcement of the water code; the office also worked with Hidalgo County in 1997 
for the county’s failure to regulate developers under the water code, which had resulted in some 
new residences having only outhouses. TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF 
TEXAS LAWS RELATED TO COLONIAS REMEDIATION AND PREVENTION (2003), 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/border/history.shtml. 
 123. See, e.g., 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 285.70 (2007) (mandating that if a septic system is 
malfunctioning, “the owner shall bring the [system] into compliance by repairing the 
malfunction” and providing strict and short time limitations for compliance); see also ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 14-236-104(b) (2007) (“any individual sewage disposal system which is 
determined by the Division of Sanitarian Services of the Department of Health to be a health 
hazard or which constitutes a nuisance due to odor or unsightly appearance must conform with 
the provisions of this chapter and applicable rules and regulations within a reasonable time after 
notification that the determination has been made”). 
 124. The Environmental Law Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law is assisting a 
community in which many septic systems are failing due to improper installation, insufficient 
surface area for the drain field, and an incompatibly high water table.  In this community, 
however, the county sanitation officer regularly declined to test the standing water, because he 
did not want to initiate enforcement proceedings against residents who could not afford to fix or 
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The scientific snapshots of existing exposures or adverse 
consequences associated with inadequate septics or drinking water in 
the United States reveal that these risks may again be significant.  In 
many states, inadequate and failing septic systems remain a serious 
problem.125  Leaking and pooled sewage from a failing septic systems 
can lead to significant public health concerns and substantial 
environmental degradation.  Untreated human sewage may contains 
parasites and pathogens that cause an array of public health problems 
usually associated with developing countries, such as gastroenteritis, 
giardiasis, cholera, hepatitis, and dysentery.126  Children are more 
susceptible to the diseases caused by these pathogens and parasites, 
because they are more likely to play in and around, or even ingest, 
the water pooling from failed septic systems. 
The poor quality of drinking water supplies for many private 
residences appears still more problematic from a public health 
standpoint.127  Risks from drinking water affect both homeowners who 
rely on private wells for their water supply and those who are 
connected to a public water supply system.  Well water can be 
contaminated by natural occurring toxins such as radionuclides and 
nitrites as well as contaminates applied to the ground that seep into 
the groundwater, such as pesticides, fertilizers, and untreated sewage 
from failing septic systems.128  While one might hope that the publicly 
owned water treatment facilities would ensure safe drinking water to 
those communities that rely on these facilities, in fact the water 
treatment infrastructure in the United States is old and breaking 
down, leaving large segments of the population at risk for consistent 
 
replace their septic systems.  Interview with Melinda Taylor, Director, Environmental Law 
Clinic, University of Texas School of Law (April 2, 2007). 
 125. See, e.g., Sewage Treatment Systems: Ohio’s Decentralized Wastewater Infrastructure 
(Ohio Department of Health) available at http://www.odh.ohio.gov./ASSETS/22E1223A9A9A4 
E5B044E91BOA7AF61C/Infrstr%20FS.pdf (estimating the failure rate for septic systems in 
Ohio at 25% and cataloging the health consequences that flow from this high failure rate); 
Howard Frumkin, Lawrence Frank, and Richard Jackson, URBAN SPRAWL AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH: DESIGNING, PLANNING AND BUILDING FOR HEALTHY COMMUNITIES 133 (Island 
Press 2004) (recognizing the public health problems caused by failing septic systems). 
 126. See O. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, SEPTIC SYSTEMS HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1991) (detailing the 
public health hazards of untreated sewage). 
 127. Dennis M. Sievers & Charles D. Fulhage, Survey of Rural Wells in Missouri for 
Pesticides and Nitrate, GROUND WATER MONITORING REV., Fall 1992, at 142, 148, figs. 4 & 5, 
tbl. 7(illustrating that 22% of the rural northwestern Missouri wells sampled exceeded the EPA 
drinking water standard for nitrate, mainly due to chemical fertilizer). 
 128. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PRIVATE DRINKING WATER 
WELLS, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/privatewells/health.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007). 
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exposure to low grade contaminants and episodic exposure to 
pathogens at dangerously high levels.129 
D. Other Legal Gaps with Potentially Significant Risks 
There are other worrisome gaps in legal protection that might 
also engender significant risks to at least pockets of the country’s 
population, which includes children.  Because these risks are even 
more diffused and difficult to isolate, we have even less information 
available to assess their significance.  Nevertheless, since the theme of 
the article is isolating and spotlighting legal blind spots, it is 
incumbent on us at least to identify these additional sources of 
unknown risks to children. The first set of risks arise from home 
chemicals, which receive little to no federal regulatory oversight, 
including toys, cleaning supplies, glues used for carpets, and paints 
(including old, leaded paint).  A notoriously weak federal regulatory 
program not only allows risky products to be marketed, but rarely if 
ever demands even minimal testing for the products.130  While there 
have been some important advancements—the banning of phthalates 
in toys, for example or the voluntary agreement by lumber treatment 
facilities to stop using CCA treated wood—the uncertainties 
surrounding most products and related household risks creates 
another large and diverse pocket of uncertain risks to children.131 
A second worrisome source of exposure arises from 
contaminated land.  Most of these exposures occur through ground 
water or onsite contact, but in some cases they can even involve 
inhalation.132  Currently, land contamination is generally discovered 
by chance, typically when government regulators are informed of the 
 
 129. See What’s On Tap?  Grading Drinking Water in U.S. Cities (Natural Resources 
Defense Coucil 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.prg/water/drinking/uscities/contents.asp.  In 
1993, for example, more than 400,000 people were made violently ill by a tiny parasite in their 
tap water called Cryptosporidium.  Several thousand were hospitalized and as many as 100 died.  
Id. at 1. 
 130. See generally John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, 
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 303-05 (1991) 
(criticizing TSCA on these grounds). 
 131. See generally Sarah Bayko, Note, Reforming the Toxic Substances Control Act to 
Protect America’s Most Precious Resource, 14 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 245 (2006) (making this argument 
and promoting a more precautionary approach). 
 132. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT REPORT ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT TECHNICAL DOCUMENT at 3-51 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
indicators/roe/pdf/EPA_Draft_ROE_TD.pdf (discussing inhalation as one of three routes of 
exposure to contaminated sites). 
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risks by private parties, such as neighbors or prospective purchasers.133  
While there is evidence of risks from land contamination to children 
and poor communities,134 the uncertainties regarding this route of 
exposure overwhelm what is known, making it particularly difficult to 
evaluate its significance. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING THE TRIAGE APPROACH: NEXT STEPS 
Systemic and potentially catastrophic risks to children’s health 
would seem likely to rise to the top of any rational risk priority 
framework, and to attract attention from the regulatory reform 
movement.  Moreover, proposed regulatory responses to such risks 
should fare well in the political arena—after all, who would express 
opposition to safe drinking water for our nation’s children? 
A. Reforming the Reformers 
Ideally, a first step to addressing these potential serious health 
risks would involve including the “legal blind spot” approach in a new 
and more comprehensive process for identifying regulatory priorities.  
The snapshots available on children’s health risks suggest that there is 
good reason for heightened regulatory attention to this under-studied 
problem.  Yet regulatory reformists, given their current quantitative-
dominated approach to regulatory analysis, have no way of 
accounting for or including these problems in their prioritization 
scheme.  At the very least, future regulatory reform must explicitly 
acknowledge—even if it involves bracketing—problems, like the 
 
 133. This is the scenario that unfolded in the Beatrice Foods scandal, chronicled in A CIVIL 
ACTION. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).  Companies such as Beatrice Foods 
can take such a position provided they do not have “knowledge” of the release of a reportable 
quantity of a hazardous substance, which is based on a daily rate of leaking that seems incapable 
of measure because of the passive nature of the release and in any event is likely to below 
reportable quantities because of the gradual leaching.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000) (“Any 
person in charge of a [vessel or] facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any release . . . of a 
hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in quantities equal to or greater than those 
determined pursuant to section 9602 of this title, immediately notify the National Response 
Center . . . of such release.”); Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2003) 
(listing reportable quantities of various hazardous substances). 
 134. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT: A FIRST VIEW OF AVAILABLE MEASURES 30-33 (2000), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/ACE_Report.htm/$file/ACE_Report.pdf 
(summarizing the high percentage of U.S. children living in counties with Superfund sites in 
1990 and 2000 and their associated risks); see also ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: 
RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (3d ed. 2000) (a classic work arguing that 
inequitable risks are imposed on poor and minority communities, including health risks arising 
from land contamination). 
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environmental risks to children, which suffer from inadequate 
research and deserve added regulation.  Simply underscoring the 
dramatic limitations in and gaps resulting from current data-
dependent methods of regulatory analysis could go a long way to 
providing a more comprehensive picture of regulatory and research 
needs for the future. 
But there are several reasons why these risks in their currently 
sketchy form are unlikely to be addressed at the federal level, and 
even once identified as potential problems, are unlikely to be 
addressed with meaningful federal requirements any time soon.  The 
first and most obvious reason is because the risks remain 
uncharacterized.  As any activist understands, political energy is 
catalyzed and the public’s attention captivated by credible and highly 
salient risks.135  General, dispersed, and relatively imprecisely 
unspecified concerns are not likely to lead to regulatory action.136  
Indeed, the most worrisome feature about the problems we highlight 
is that there is a potential for significant health risks to children, but 
we do not know their extent or severity because we are not 
monitoring or assessing the problems.  The resulting Catch 22—an 
issue is not salient until the problem is monitored and characterized; 
but it is unlikely to be monitored until a political body takes action—
leaves open the possibility that these problems will become self-
perpetuating blind spots.  Only voluntary and perhaps privately 
funded research by scientists might identify credible risks, which in 
turn can generate more political attention.  Until then, the powerful 
inertia associated with ignorance may keep the issues beneath the 
political radar. 
These problems may also resist political response because they 
primarily afflict poor communities, a group that is notoriously 
underrepresented in the political arena.137  As Landrigan et al. 
summarize: “The six million children who live in poverty in inner 
cities in the United States [face disproportionately high] exposures to 
lead, air pollution, [pesticides], and hazardous waste sites, as well as 
[a] disproportionately high prevalence of lead poisoning and 
incidence of asthma. . . .”138  Poor families rarely have the extra 
resources or time to represent their interests and cannot afford to 
 
 135. See, e.g., Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: 
The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 421, 442-55, 479 (1999).  
 136. Id. at 422, 442, 446. 
 137. See generally BULLARD, supra note 134. 
 138. Landrigan et al., supra note 89, at 436. 
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contribute to or establish nonprofits to advocate on their behalf.  As a 
result, their needs can drop out of legislative or administrative 
attempts to ensure adequate health protection.  Moreover, even when 
the particular health and safety concerns of the underprivileged are 
known to policymakers, many factors may conspire to push these 
concerns to the back burner. 
Finally, because the environmental threats we identify generally 
concentrate in localized areas, sometimes as small as a residence but 
rarely larger than a county, their redress is generally left to state or 
even local governments.  However, because the solutions to these 
problems will typically impose costs on some of the states’ most 
influential interest groups (as pesticide restrictions and air toxic 
controls would), states might be unable to overcome special interest 
resistance to protect their citizens.  Again, some data indicating that 
the problems are real and national in scope would be needed to move 
these issues to the top of the federal agenda, but since this data is 
unlikely to be generated without regulatory requirements, we see 
another aspect of the Catch 22. 
B. Relying on Universities and Law Schools to Take the Lead 
Given the unlikelihood that the triage approach will gain 
purchase among reformists or within political movements, the next 
best opportunity for capitalizing on its promise is to encourage 
universities to incorporate its lessons into their research agendas and 
practicum offerings.  In contrast to nonprofit and private sectors, 
universities actually receive some unique benefits from engaging in 
research and representation of poor communities, even when the 
risks are poorly specified and there is no possibility for direct political 
or financial benefits as a result of the engagement. 
Most universities and particularly law schools are eager for 
“practice” opportunities, particularly for complex interdisciplinary 
problems raised by unspecified yet potentially serious health risks.  
The rapid growth of environmental law clinics in the nation’s law 
schools is a testament to student demand and pedagogical recognition 
of the value of interdisciplinary, practice-oriented instruction.  
Universities are recognizing that they benefit from public outreach.  
State schools are most cognizant of these benefits since they often 
depend on state legislative support.139  Providing evidence that they 
 
 139. For example, in a speech to the University of Texas community, the president of the 
University at the time, President Faulkner, emphasized that the University “must find fresh 
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are “giving back” to the community can thus be a high priority.  
Private universities are also slowly responding to criticisms that they 
have become too insulated and seek ways to contribute their 
expertise to assist needy communities. 
1. The Role of Universities. 
The most logical vehicle for a university presence in researching 
these problems is an interdisciplinary practicum or clinic modeled 
after, or housed in, a law school clinic.  Poor communities that face 
the unspecified risks highlighted in this paper are perfect clients for 
such a clinical exercise since addressing their problems will require 
considerable client contact; complex problem-solving skills; 
interdisciplinary teamwork; and legal research on local, state, and 
federal law.  In fact, the features of these problems that make them 
resistant to political action are the same features that make them 
particularly attractive to universities: they involve complex research 
questions regarding risk characterization; they afflict unrepresented 
groups in need of assistance; and they are localized, often in pockets 
not too far from a university, and hence can be “tackled” by teams of 
professors and students.  The fact that the communities are politically 
powerless and unable to donate or otherwise support research or 
advocacy on their behalf also make them more, rather than less, 
attractive to universities. 
Since these unknown risks are spread out across the country and 
are complex, however, it is also prudent for universities to engage in 
some collective action or economies of scale, both in order to 
accomplish more community health protection and also to generate a 
larger, national picture of the scope of the problems.  Ideally, then, 
universities that decide to address these unspecified environmental 
threats to children’s health would form a larger organization that 
shared information, collaborated on strategies and approaches, and 
even attempted to make sure that their work was consistent enough 
to permit larger extrapolations or generalizations nationwide.  This 
work of addressing the problems at a grander scale would provide yet 
another pedagogical benefit to the students.  Through virtual or real-
time conferences, perhaps arranged once or twice a semester, 
interdisciplinary teams at different law schools or universities could 
 
ways to build public support among state leadership.”  New President Must Develop Stable 
Financial Model for UT, Faulkner Says in His Final Address on State of the University, ON 
CAMPUS, Sep. 30, 2005 (excerpting Faulkner’s speech), available at http://www.utexas.edu/ 
opa/ic/oncampus/2005/sept/faulkner.html. 
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share evidence and develop strategies.  We thus recommend not only 
that universities dedicate themselves more explicitly and actively to 
these types of problems—particularly since there is no realistic hope 
that others will otherwise attend to them—but we also recommend a 
more unified front for law school clinics through collective action and 
collective organization. 
2. The Work of Clinics. 
Since rampant uncertainties pull particular, potentially important 
risks to children’s health below the surface so they remain invisible 
and uninteresting to policymakers and the public at large, the clinics’ 
job is to research these problems to bring them into sharper focus.  If 
there turn out to be significant, unaddressed problems, universities of 
course cannot fix the problems by themselves; but their role in 
generating information could prove of pivotal importance in moving 
off the inertial state of ignorance that deters political action.  Clinics 
can also work closely with individual communities to minimize the 
extent of their community-specific risks in the short and the long-
term. 
Specifically, we envision at least four separate, but concurrent 
roles for a clinic in ensuring better health protection for individual 
communities and generating more information on the nature and 
extent of these various, unspecified risks.  The first role would involve 
interacting with the community to better identify the health risks 
from pesticide applications, air toxics, failed septic systems, or 
contaminated wells.  In some cases, where the risks are significant 
enough to warrant immediate intervention, this role could also 
include actively educating the community about how to minimize 
certain types of risks.  Rutgers, for example, is developing an 
educational videotape for poor urban communities in New Jersey 
about how to minimize urban exposures to pesticides.140 
Second, the clinic would seek to redress basic gaps in 
information, which could include working with the community to 
institute more vigorous monitoring.  Since this role might be quite 
technical, there might be less room for community involvement in 
designing the information collection systems.  Their local knowledge 
could help point to more specific locations in need of monitoring, like 
groundwater and air, but the nature of the contaminants, the 
 
 140. See, e.g., MARK ROBSON, URBAN RESIDENTIAL IPM STRATEGIES (2006), 
http://www.epa.gov/oppbppd1/PESP/regional_grants/2003/r2-2003-final.htm . 
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frequency, and other decisions might need to be made independent 
from them and ideally could be unified across clinics. 
Ultimately, if a community is willing and the science does suggest 
that a blind spot is serious and has lead to past and continuing harm, a 
clinic could also work as advocates for the community in the 
legislature, before a state or local agency, in the city or local 
government, or through the courts.  The clinic’s advocacy role would 
be determined by the community, but again would generate 
important information not only about the scientific nature of various 
risks but also about the community’s own response to that 
information.  Identifying realistic alternatives and communicating 
them to the community—for example, the grants and costs of 
centralizing septic systems versus upgrades versus the status quo—can 
involve a tremendous amount of research and effort and again 
provides an invaluable service as well as a tremendous educational 
experience for graduate students. 
Finally, a clinic could work as an advocate at a broader scale on 
problems that appear to afflict many communities at once.  This role 
would seem the least well defined, but we imagine that a collective 
national environmental law clinic project could establish a national 
board of experts (ideally mostly students) who could testify before 
Congress and work on national and model state legislation, as well as 
work with the EPA and other federal agencies on key projects.  They 
might also provide more creative national or statewide reports or 
recommendations for reform based on their work.  For example, as 
information increases about risks from certain types of pesticides in 
urban areas, as it did for chlorpyrifos and diazinon,141 the clinics could 
join to lobby EPA and Congress for more expeditious attention to 
these national risks that are best addressed at the national, licensing 
stage.  This collective advocacy could also fill a nonprofit void in 
protecting the poor against “hot spots” of environmental risks. 
Although it is not even two years old, our experience with an 
interdisciplinary clinic at the University of Texas Law School formed 
along the parameters we have outlined gives us some confidence that 
the model we propose is both realistic and promising.  At the 
University of Texas, our interdisciplinary environmental law clinic 
dedicates most of its efforts to working with disadvantaged 
 
 141. See Jim Morris, EPA Bans Pesticide Dursban,Says Alternatives Available, CNN.COM 
HEALTH, June 8, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/06/08/dursban.ban.02/ 
index.html. 
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communities to improve the quality of private drinking water and 
wastewater services and to address “hot spots” of air toxic 
contamination.142  Although the clinic currently can only manage a 
few “client” communities at one time, it has made impressive traction 
in assessing uncharacterized risks to the community and in identifying 
alternative steps that the community can take to minimize risk. 
 
 142. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, CLINICAL PROGRAMS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/clinics/environment (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2007) (“The substantive focus of the clinic in the fall will be: the representation 
of several low income communities that currently lack access to reliable and sanitary wastewater 
disposal systems and clean drinking water; improving air quality for citizens in Southeast 
Houston who suffer from exposure to toxic air pollutants; and several water policy issues.”). 
